George Saltas v. David A. Affleck and Kenneth Butte : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1940
George Saltas v. David A. Affleck and Kenneth
Butte : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Harry G. Metos, Samuel Bernstein; attorneys for respondent.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Saltas v. Affleck, No. 6190 (Utah Supreme Court, 1940).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/529
t Caoe \o. bi'IO t·~· ~~~~---------------g, 
~ 
i, 
~-
~ 
} 
,. 
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
. GEORGE SALT AS. 
Plaintiff and Respondent. J 
vs. ' 
:. DAVID A. AfFLECK. doing busi-
: ness under name and style of D.) 
A. AFFLECK GROCERY, 
Defendant I 
~- KENNETH BUTTE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
H. C. :WETOS, 
SAMECL BERNSTEIN, 
Attorneys lor Respondent. 
~:4·~- ---~~~~---,;;....; ~~r~_.: -~• _ ..... -.......... .....__ ...... 
:_"'. ,._.., -~ ,_ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX TO AUTHORITIES 
Page 
American Fork City v. Charlier, 43 Utah 231, 134 P. 739............ 29 
American Rairlway Express Co. vs. Lancaster, 251 S. W. 670 .... ~1 
Ashby v. Va. Ry. & Power Co .. 122 S. E. 104 ................................ ~1 
Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 P. (2d) 224 ................................ 15 
Berry v. Dewey, 172 P. 27 ................................................................ 12 
Bright v. Thatcher, 215 S. W. 788 ................................................ 1~ 
43 c. J .. p. 579 ················································································ 27 
46 c. J.. p. 207 --------·······················--·············································· 11 
Christiansen v. Devine. 210 Ill. App. 253 ........................................ 31 
Duckwell v. Davis, 142 N. E. 113 ------------------------··························· ~1 
Eagan v. O'Malley, 21 P. (2d) 821 ................................................ 16 
El Paso Ry. Co. v. Buttery, 216 S. W. 897 .................................... 12 
Gibson v. Geo. G. Doyle & Co., 37 Utah 21, 106 P. 512 ................ 32 
Gibson v. Wineman, 106 So. 826 ·····----·····-----······-····················· 12 
Hunter v. Wm. M. Roylance Co., 45 Utah 135, 143 P. 140 ... ·......... 32 
Klinge v. Southern Pacific Co., 89 Utah 284, 57 P. (2d) 367 ........ 9 
Louisville Ry. Co. v. Smith, 263 S. W. 29 .................................... 13 
McMahon v. Flynn, 191 N. W. 902 ................................................ 13 
Neary v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 110 P. 226 ............................ 28 
Pierre v. Powell Box Co., 7? So. 943 ................................................ 11 
Pulos v. D. & R. G. Co., 3? Utah 238, 10? P. 224 ........................ ~1 
· Reid v. Owens, (Utah) 93 P. (2d) 680 -----------------------····················· 23 
Roper v. Greenspon, et al, 198 S. W. 110? .................................... 27 
Skidmore v. Seattle, 224 P. 545 .................................................... 12 
Stewart, Stewart-Morehead Co. v. Bibb Mfg. Co., 124 S. E. 64...... 29 
Thomas v. Frost, 83 Utah 20?, 2? P. (2d) 459 ........................•....... 31 
Wirth v. Alex Dussell Iron Works, 74 So. 551 ------------------------------- 12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GEORGE SALTAS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
DAVID A. AFFLECK, doing busi-
ness under name and style of D. 
A. AFFLECK GROCERY, 
Defendant 
KENNETH BlJITE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 6190 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT 
The appellant charges counsel for respondent with 
bad faith, deliberate misconduct and with a systematic 
plan of procedure to obtain an unjust verdict through 
reference to the fact that the appellant is protected by an 
insurance company. 
Before going into the questions raised in appellant's 
brief, we desire to state that counsel for the appellant 
have deliberately overlooked matters which would cure 
any defect in single instructions claimed to be erroneouA, 
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a.nd have based much of their brief on a deliberate mis-
quotation of the record. For instance, counsel for appel· 
lant in their brief on page 53 claim that counsel, in 
his closing argument to the jury stated: "on the day of 
the accident or soon thereafter an investigator or an ad-
juster was out at the scene of the accident." Counsel 
have deliberately added the words, ··or adjuster" to the 
sentence (Tr. 321), and based upon such misquotation 
devote a good portion of their argument for new trial. 
Appellant also complains about certain of the Court's 
instructions as being erroneous, hut he fails to mention 
admissions in the pleadings and record, and the instruc· 
tions which would cure all objections raised by the ap· 
pellant. 
It is elementary that the trial court's instructions, 
although separately given, are to he construed as a 
whole, yet, counsel for the appellant ingeniously omitted 
and failed to recognize this fundamental rule. We make 
these opening remarks so that this Court will get the 
proper p~rspective upon the appellant's argument and 
that this case will he decided in accordance to what .ap· 
pears in the entire record, and not as to what the appel-
lant would like to have the record show. 
The respondent will argue the questions involved in 
this case in the order raised by the appellant. 
The trial court has the power and authority to gr/Jf&t 
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' 
a new trial when in its discretion it deems the verdict of 
the jury inadequate or unjust and such action will not 
be interferred with, except where there is a clear abuse 
of discretion. 
The plaintiff brought this action to recover dam-
ages for the death of his son, who was killed in an auto-
mobile collision at the intersection of Third A venue 
and .. K.. Street in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
At the time of the collision, plaintiffs son was rid-
ing as a passenger in an automobile driven by one Gerald 
Franz when the defendant Kenneth Butte drove his 
truck against the Franz automobile when the same was 
almost over the intersection, and fatally injured Mr. 
Saltas. 
At the time of his death, the deceased was earning 
$2000.00 a year as a machinist, was thirty years of age 
and had a life expectancy of thirty-five years; was in 
good robust health; lived with plaintiff and the other 
members of the family, and contributed most of his 
earnings to the plaintiff for his support and for- the 
support of plaintiff's family. The plaintiff had been ill 
for some time and the deceased was giving him financial 
aid to keep the family going. That deceased throughout 
his life had worked with his father on a farm, and worked 
at Bingham Canyon, Utah, for the Utah Copper Com-
pany, and during the depression contributed practically 
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b 
all .of his check to the family. We make this statement 
because it has been omitted by the appellant in his 
Statement of the case. 
The jury, in the first case against Kenneth Butte, 
the appellant herein, returned a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff in the sum of ·$800 .. 00. The plaintiff filed a 
motion for a new trial, alleging the statutory grounds 
and asking for· new trial upon the ground that, under 
the law and the evidence, the damages awarded by the 
jury were inadequate and that the verdict was rendered 
under misapprehension of the instructions, or under the 
influence of passion or prejudice. The motion was argued 
and at the conclusion thereof the court stated: 
THE COURT: "I am inclined to think at this time 
that the verdict is too low; I do not mean to say that I 
will find it low, but the matter will be taken under ad-
visement." (Tr. 430) 
Thereafter the court made an order that plaintiff's 
motion for new trial be granted unless the defendant, 
Kenneth Butte, within twenty days after notice consent 
that the verdict of the jury be increased to $2400.00, and 
judgment entered accordingly . 
. The defendant did not give his consent to such an 
increase and the case was set for trial for a second time. 
Upon the second trial, the jury returned a verdict in 
favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $3,061.00. 
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7 
The appellant argues that the order granting a new 
trial was void because there was no showing that there 
was a plain disregard by the jury of the instructions 
of the court or the evidence. and the trial court could not 
increase the verdict. 
In answer to these contentions. all that need he said 
is that the function of a motion for a new trial in cases 
where the cause was tried before a jury is to give the 
trial court an opportunity to set aside any verdict which 
is the result of passion or prejudice or misunderstanding, 
or which is grossly unjust between the parties. 
The trial court had heard the evidence and had 
before it the instructions and it was very apparent 
from the evidence that the decedent and Gerald Franz, 
the driver of the car which decedent had been riding 
as a passenger, were free from any contributory negli-
gence9 and that the appellant herein was guilty of the 
grossest kind of negligence in the driving and operation 
of his truck. 
The case was submitted to the jury at 5:05 p. m. 
and the jury returned at 6:05 p.m.-within one hour. (Tr. 
25) It was apparent to the court that the jury returned 
"a quick verdict" and that it did not go fully into the 
instructions and the evidence; and that the plaintiff, 
if he was entitled to any judgment at all, was entitled to 
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a substantial sum. The court's judgment in the case that 
plaintiff was entitled to a substantial sum is strength-
ened by the second verdict rendered in the case in the 
sum of $3,061.00. 
The fact that the trial court gave the appellant 
an opportunity to save himself a new trial by consent-
ing to increase in the judgment, w.as certainly not harm-
ful or prejudicial in any manner to his interests. He was 
not forced to accept the increase nor did he accept it; 
so, there is no reason for any complaint to he made on 
his part. If any of the parties were prejudiced by such 
an order it would have been the plaintiff, who would 
have been precluded from a new trial had the appellant 
consented to the increase of the judgment. 
The appellant further argues that the court im-
properly granted a new trial because there is no statu-
tory ground provided in motion for new trials based upon 
inadequate damages appearing to have been given by 
a jury under the influence of passion, prejudice, or mis-
understanding. This contention has no merit. Section 
104-40-7, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, reads as follows: 
"The verdict of a Jury may also he vacated 
and a new trial granted by the court in which 
the action is pending, on its own motion, without 
the application of either of the parties, when 
there has been a plain disregard by the jury of 
the instructions of the court or the evidence in 
the case as to satisfy the court that the verdict 
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9 
was rendered under a misapprehension of such 
instructions or under the influence of passion or 
prejudice." 
In Klinge vs. Southern Pacific Company, 89 Utah 
284, 57 Pacific (2nd) 367 
This court, on page 373, stated: 
"The court also within its descretion was 
justified and authorized to grant a new trial on 
the ground that the verdict was inadequate, in 
view of the undisputed evidence that the earn-
ing capacity of the plaintiff during the last 10 
years prior to the accident was about $2,000 a 
year, that since his disability he was unable to 
follow or be employed in his usual occupation of 
railroading or in any other employment of gain 
or profit or of any substantial remuneration, and 
since his injury he was unable to earn and had 
not earned anything. Under all the authorities, 
great latitude is accorded the trial court in such 
matter. Cases are cited by appellant where ver-
dicts of $10,000 or less for the loss of an arm were 
regarded as adequate compensation; but in most 
such cases the earning capacity of the injured 
plaintiff was much less than that of the plaintiff 
in the instant case. In such particular, each case 
is dependent upon its own facts, and what may 
be inadequate compensation in the one may he 
he adequate in the other. Hence, a wide discre-
tion is given the trial court in such matter and 
rarely is interfered with by an appellate tribu-
nal whether the awarded compensation by the 
court below was held adequate or inadequate. In 
46 C. J. 207, the rule is stated that inadequate 
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10 
compensation for an injury sustained is general-
ly ground for a new trial, and that a statute 
providing that •the jury may give such damages 
as under all the circumstances of the case may 
to them seem just,' does not affect the court's 
right to grant a new trial where it deems the 
damages inadequate. In the case of Dorset v. 
Chambers, 187 Mo. App. 276, 173 S. W. 725, the 
court said that in tort cases the trial judge is 
as much a trier of facts as the jury and is charged 
with the final duty of doing justice between the 
parties. The question before him for solution 
where the plaintiff asks for a new trial on the 
ground of an inadequate verdict is not whether 
the assessment is so inadequate as to shock the 
judicial conscience and bespeak passion or pre-
judice on the part of the jury, but whether it 
is out of line with the evidentiary facts and cir-
cumstances as the judge sees and understands 
them. 
That no abuse of discretion in the instant 
case was committed by the trial court. * * * The 
rule is well established that a presumption exists 
that a trial court did not err or abuse his dis-
cretion in granting or refusing a new trial, and 
that the burden is upon him complaining of the 
ruling to show a clear abuse of discretion. Utah 
State Nat. Bank vs. Livingston, 69 Utah 284, 
254 P. 781; Thomas v. Ogden Rapid Transit Co., 
47 Utah 595, 155 P. 436; Hirabelli v. Daniels, 44 
Utah 88, 138 P. 1172; White v. Union Pac. R. 
Co., 8 Utah 56, 29 P. 1030; Alt. v. Chicago & N. W. 
Ry. Co., 5 S. D. 20, 57 N. W. 1126, 1128: Koch 
v. Imhof, 315 Pa. 145, 172 AJ. 672, 673; O'Barr 
v. Pioneer Life Ins. Co., 172 S. C. 72, 172 S. E. 
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769; .(. C. J. 798. In the case af Alt. v. Chicago, 
etc, Ry. Co., supra, that court, in a personal in ... 
jury case, stated that: 'It requires a court as well 
as a jury to try causes of this nature, and, while 
the jury is the judge of the facts viewed in the 
light of the law, as a rule no verdict should stand 
when, in the sound judgment of the trial court, 
its operates as a wrong between the parties which 
might be remedied upon a retrial.' " 
~ 
The foregoing holds that the court has the discre-
tion, where it deems the verdict of a jury as inadequate 
to grant a new trial; and the burden is upon him who 
complains of the ruling to show a clear abuse of dis-
cretion. We cannot see any abuse of such discretion in 
this case~ 
In 46 C. J., p. 207, dealing with the question of in-
adequate damages, n ~ stated: 
"While formerly at common law, it seems, a 
verdict in an action of tresspass could not he 
set aside at all for inadequacy, now a new trial 
for inadequacy of damages is largely in the dis-
cretion of the court. That the damages recovered 
are clearly inadequate compensation for the in-
jury sustained is generally ground for a new trial. 
And a statute providing that 'jury may give such 
damages as, under all circumstances of the case 
may to them seem jzut,' does not affect the court's 
right to grant a new trial where it deems the 
damages inadequate." 
In the case of Pierre v. Powell Box Co., 77 So. 943, 
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a verdict of $2500.00 was held inadequate and increased 
to $7500.00 for the death of a laborer whose parents 
brought an action for his death fo:r; loss of prospective 
support, companionship and filial affection. 
In Gibson v. Wineman, 106 So. 826, a verdict of 
$500.00 for the death of a decedent 37 years of age and 
earning $2.00 a day, was held to be so inadequate as to 
evince bias, passion and prejudice on the part of the jury. 
In Skidmore v. Seattle, 244 P. 545, a verdict of 
$1200.00 was increased to $2500.00 for loss of the services 
of a son 15 years of age who earned 25 to 30 cents an 
hour, while working. 
In Wirth v. Alex Dussell Iron Works, 74 So. 551, 
a verdict of $3000.00 was increased to $6000.00 for the 
death of the decedent who was 45 years of age. 
In Berry v. Dewey, 172 P. 27, a' verdict of $5000.00 
to the mother of decedent, where decedent was 33 years 
old and in good health and able to earn about $1000.00 a 
year, was held not to be excessive. 
In El Paso Ry. Co. v. Buttery, 216 S. W. 897, a ver· 
diet of $10,000.00 to the mother of the decedent, where 
decedent was 24 years old, unmarried, and earned $125.00 
per month, and the mother was 54 years old, was held 
not to be excessive. 
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In the case of Bright v. Thatcher, 215 S. W. 788, a 
verdict of $?500.00 to the mother of the deceased, where 
deceased was 49 years old and earned $125.00 per month, 
and the mother was ?4 years old, was held not to be ex-
cessive. 
In McMahon v. Flynn, 191 N. Vl. 902, a verdict of 
$5500.00 to the mother, who had a life expectancy of 12 
years and decendent was 29 years old and earned $110.00 
per month, was held to be reasonable. 
In Louisville Railway Co. v. Smith, 263 S. W. 29, a 
verdict for $15,000.00 to the administrator of the estate 
of the decedent, who was 2? years old and had a life 
expectancy of more than 30 years and was earning $300.00 
per month, was held to be reasonable. 
While hundreds of cases can be cited on this ques-
tion, such cases are only for persuasive purposes and are 
not in any way binding on the court, because the court 
has the discretionary power to deal with each case upon 
its own merits. 
The reason that it is necessary, where a jury passes 
upon questions of fact, to file a motion for a new trial 
is to give the court the opportunity to set aside any judg-
ment which is the result of passion or prejudice or mis-
understanding or which is grossly unjust between the 
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parties. We submit that the verdict in the first case was 
inadequate and the result of bias and prejudice on the 
part of the jury, and was properly set aside and a new 
trial granted. 
There was no error relating to insurance indemnifi-
cation. 
Before the jury was drawn, counsel for the appel-
lant stated: 
MR. STEWART: If your Honor please, at this 
time I wish to offer in evidence Policy Number AU 206787, 
issued by the Northwest Casualty Company, on the 28th 
day of September, 1937, and effective from that date 
until the 28th day of September, 1938, and covering the 
period when this accident occurred, being a policy issued 
to D. A. Affleck doing business as Affleck Grocery, 
which has been identified as "Exhibit 1," the same being 
offered for the purpose that I am about to mention, and 
for no other purpose, and particularly paragraph 5, on 
page 2, defined the insured, which paragraphing reads as 
follows: 
"V. DEFINITION OF 'INSURED' 
"The unqualified word * * * 
MR. METOS: I object to him reading anything. 
you Honor. 
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MR. STEW ART: I offer it in evidence and partic-
ularly this paragraph. (Tr. 18-19) 
The appellant claimed that he introduced the policy 
of insurance to show that he was not covered under it. 
The policy was received into evidence upon the insistence 
of appellant's conusel and over the objection of the plain-
tiff. It was received as an exhibit for the court and not 
for the jury. 
The appellant complains that the plaintiff com-
mitted error in the voir dire examination of the jury 
because they were interrogated as to whether or not they 
were officers, agents, or stockholders of the Northwest 
Casualty Company, the insurance company, which is-
sued the policy of insurance that was introduced into 
evidence. Appellant says that it was apparent that ask-
ing each juror individually those questions was to "tell 
them" of the existence of liability insurance. 
Contrary to what the appellant states in his brief, 
it appears from the examination that jurors Langton 
and Wilson were agents of a casualty company. Cer-
tainly, where it is shown that a casualty company is 
interested in the action by reason of the issuance of a 
policy, it is an interested party, and plaintiff is en-
titled to interrogate the respective juror if they are 
connected with such a company as officers, agents, or 
stockholders, Balle vs. Smith, 81 Utah 1?9, 1? P. (2d) 224. 
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The fact that some of the jurors were not engaged in 
the insurance business does not necessarily mean that 
they might not be interested in casualty companies. Lia-
bility insurance is a common business, and people in the 
various walks of life may be interested in it as stock-
holders or otherwise. In this day and age it is not un-
common for widows, farmers, workmen, professional men, 
und other people engaged in various occupations to in-
vest their money in insurance companies. 
In Eagan vs. O'Malley, (Wyo.) 21 P. (2d) 821, coun-
sel in that case complained that by reason of the fact 
that most of the jury panel was composed of ranchers or 
farmers, it was bad faith on the part of counsel for 
the plaintiff to interrogate the jurors as to whether they 
were interested in a casualty insurance company, the 
court stated: 
"The examination of jurors on voir dire, 
when properly conducted, as all members of the 
profession know, serves a useful purpose in select-
ing triers of fact. Among other things, it enables 
both parties, plaintiff and defendant alike, to 
know the relationship, if any, existing between 
any juror and a party who, though he may not 
appear so of record, it still a party in interest ... 
"As a result of an extended examination of 
the cases dealing with the question, we consider it 
easily deducible that the great weight of authority 
and the better reasoning alike sanction the view 
that counsel for the plaintiff is entitled in good 
faith to inquire whether any juror is interested 
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17 
in or connected with any insurance or casualty 
company that may be interested in the case as an 
insurer of the defendant's liability. See 35 C. J. 
394, 56 A. L. R. 14~. note; 7 4 A. L. R. 860, note. 
Some of the more recent cases approving this 
rule-all decided during the year 1932-are: Mor-
ton v. Holscher (S. D.) 243 N. W. 89: Halbrook v. 
Williams, 185 Ark. 885, 50 S. W. (2d) 243; Jenkins 
v. Chase (Mo. Sup.) 53 S. W. (2d) 21; Wack v. 
F. E. Schoenberg Mfg. Co. (Mo. Sup.) 53 S W. 
(2d) 28; Pate vs. Pickwick Stages System (Cal. 
App.) 14 P. (2d) 1?4; Balle v. Smith (Utah) 17 
P. (2d) 224. 
"In the case at bar, nothing appears in the 
record that we can see which would indicate that 
co1msel was not propounding the inquiry quoted 
above in good faith. . . . The fact that most of 
the jury panel was composed of ranchers or 
farmers does not make the possibility of finding 
one interested in liability insurance so remote as 
to indicate bad faith on counsel's part. Liability 
insurance is a common business and people in 
many walks of life are more or less interested 
in it." 
The questions propounded to the jurors were made 
m good faith and in conformity with the rules laid 
down in the Balle vs. Smith case, supra. In this case 
there is no question that the Northwest Casualty Com-
pany is an interested party in the action. Its policy is 
one of the exhibits in this case. It was an unorthodox 
procedure for the appellant to offer such policy into 
evidence, and it seems to plaintiff that the appellant was 
laying a ground work for an appeal by introducing such 
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18 
policy, so that in the event of an adverse judgment he 
could predicate an argutnent that the jury brought a 
verdict against him because he was backed by an in-
surance company, and by grasping here and there at un-
avoidable statements, some of which the appellant has 
stretched beyond recognition, and so urges this court 
to grant him a new trial. 
The appellant further complains that counsel com-
mitted misconduct by asking one of the appellant's wit-
nesses, Norma Chamberlain, who was riding in the truck 
with the appellant at the time of the accident, if she 
"gave a statement to a man by the name of Parkinson, 
who is an adjuster for an insurance company." This wit-
ness had testified on direct examination that she saw the 
Franz car before it entered the intersection and that, in 
her opinion, it was traveling at the rate of 40 miles per 
hour. (Tr. 192). 
Counsel for plaintiff called her attention to the fact 
that she had previously testified in the case of State vs. 
Kenneth Butte, and at that trial stated that the first time 
she saw the Franz coupe "was when it loomed right in 
front of you." (Tr. 196) 
The witness answered: "I don't remember." 
Q. And do you remember making this statement, 
that the first time that you saw the Ford coupe was when 
it loomed right in front of you? 
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A. 1 don't remember. 
Q. Do you remember making such a statement~ 
to the effect that the first time you saw it was when 
the Ford Coupe loomed right in front of you? 
A. I don't know exactly what it was 
Q. You were - - -
MR. STEWART: What were you going to say? 
A. I want to say that the car loomed in front of 
me, I saw it before it came in front of us. 
Q. (By Mr. Metos) In other words, as I under-
stand you, you want to say you saw this car prior to 
the time it entered the intersection, is that what you 
want us to believe, or did you see it just as it got in 
front of you, a few feet away? 
A. Well, I saw, then it was right in front of me. 
Q. Did you see it right in front of you. That is 
what I mean. You saw it when it was in front of you, 
for the first time? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Now, let me call your attention to this. Right 
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after the accident you made out an affidavit to-you 
gave a statement to a man by the name of Parkinson, 
who is an adjuster for an Insurance company? 
MR. STEWART: Just a moment. 
MR. METOS: I want to know. 
MR. STEWART: Just a moment, if your Honor 
please; I assign that as prejudicial misconduct. Mr. Park-
inson is associated with me. I take an exception to coun-
sel's statement and at this time I ask that the jury he 
discharged; prejudicial misconduct of the worst kind, 
and counsel there knows it is, or should know it. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
Q. (By Mr. Metos) You made a statement to him, 
did you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you stated to him, when he took your 
statement, that when you saw the Ford car it was going 
thirty-five miles an hour, didn't you? 
A. Yes, about that. 
Q. And on cross examination on April 4th, you 
stated right here in this court room that you didn't see 
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the car, and that the statement you made, going thirty-
five miles an hour, wasn't true. Do you recall that? 
A. I don't remember saying that. 
Q. You stated that in this statement you made, 
that you had made a mistake as to the speed when you 
saw this car. That is right, isn't it? 
A. I don't recall making-saying that I didn't 
know, I couldn't judge the speed of the car. 
Q. I didn't ask you about judgment the speed of 
the car, I asked you if you didn't make a statement to 
Parkinson to the effect when you saw the Ford car it 
was going thirty-five miles all hour, and later on, on cross 
examination here, by Marion Romney, you admitted 
that you did not make such a statement, although it 
already appeared in your statement or affidavit or what-
ever you want to call it. That is right," isn't it? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. You wouldn't say you didn't make .it, would 
you? 
A. I don't remember making it. 
Q. What is that? 
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A. I don't remember making it. 
Q. You don't remember making it, but would you 
say you did not make it, positively? 
MR. STEWART: I have her statement here if you 
want to see it, the original affidavit that she signed, if 
you want to see it. If you want to see it, I will be glad 
to let you have it. 
MR. METOS: That isn't the one. 
MR. STEWART: That is the affidavit she made to 
Mr. Parkinson-the statement she made to him on Janu-
ary 28, 1938. (Tr. 196-198) 
The plaintiff had the right to examine the witness 
as to any prior inconsistent statement that she may have 
made to any person. Her statement on direct examination 
that she saw the Franz car before it entered the inter-
section, traveling 40 miles per hour was pertinent to the 
issues in this case. The witness kept hedging the ques· 
tion by stating, "I don't remember," when asked if it 
was a fact that she did not see the Franz car until it was 
directly in front of her. It was important to show that 
the witness had previously told Parkinson and the of-
ficers that she had never seen the car until it loomed 
right in front of the car she was riding in. 
As already indicated the witness stated in her direct 
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examination that she saw the car traveling at 40 miles 
per hour. Upon cross examination concerning the state-
ment she gave to Parkinson she stated that the car was 
traveling at 35 miles per hour. We see nothing wrong in 
asking a witness if she talked to a certain person who 
took a statement from her as a represenative of a com-
pany. Any sting that the question has was offset by 
counsel for the appellant who promptly stated that "Mr. 
Parkinson is associated with me." There is no indica-
tion that the verdict in this case was in any way influ-
enced by the question complained of. The question was 
asked in good faith. Any error in this statement was 
cured by the court's instruction number 29 which in-
structed the jury not to consider the question of insurance. 
(Tr. 316) The re-direct examination of Miss Chamberlain 
concerning her statement to Parkinson clearly indicated 
that she had made a statement and it was certainly 
relevant and competent to call her attention to any prior 
inconsistent statements she may have made to Park-
mson. 
In the case of Reid vs. Owens, (Utah) 93 P. (2d) 680, 
this court stated: 
"Despite the general rule which excludes 
testimony showing liability insurance, it never-
theless may he received in evidence when an allu-
sion to insurance is part of an admission of liahil-
ty or responsibility. Tanner v. Smith, 97 Mont. 
229, 240, 33 P. (2d) 547; Smith v. Baggett, 218 Ala. 
227, 118 So. 283; O'Connor v. Sioux Falls Motor 
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Co., 57 S. D. 39?, 232 N. W. 904; Herschensohn 
v. Weisman, 80 N. H. 557, 119 A. 705; 28 A. L. R. 
514; Curcic v. Nelson Display Co., 19 Cal. App. 
(2d) 46, 57,64 P. (2d) 1153, 1159; Rowe vs. Rennick, 
112 Cal. App. 576, 585, 297 P. 603; Potter v. Driver, 
97 Cal. App. 311, 317, 275 P. 526; Nichols v. Nel-
son, 80 Cal. App. 590, 596, 252 P. 739; and annota-
tion in 56 A. L. R. 1418, 1448; 74 A. L. R. 849, 
856, 95 A. L. R. 388; 105 A. L. R. 1319, 1326. See, 
also, Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 192, 17 P (2d) 
224. 
"To hold it reversible error to permit allu-
sions to insurances, though such allusions are in 
themselves admissions, would be to reject other-
wise competent testimony, material to the issue--
indeed, perhaps the only material evidence on a 
vital issue-on the assumption that the jury would 
disregard its plain duty and resolve the ques· 
tion of defendant's liability, not on the evidenre 
relative to his wrong, but on that respecting who 
would ultimately have to pay." 
In the above case the reference was to the effect 
that the defendant carried liability insurance. In this 
case there is nothing to indicate that Butte carried in-
surance. 
The appellant further claims that counsel for the 
plaintiff in his argument to the jury stated "on the day 
of the accident or soon thereafter, an investigator or 
adjuster was out at the scene of the accident.'• We have 
already pointed out that this is a deliberate misquota-
tion of the record because counsel have added the words 
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or adjuster to the quotation. (Tr. 321) Counsel also claims 
it was error to state that the "defendant' secured an at-
torney who spends all his time in the defense of this 
class of cases:· The record shows this objection or com-
plaint was made after the arguments to the jury were 
closed and ''when the jury left the court room." The 
objection, if you can call it that, should have been made 
when the purported statements were alleged to have been 
made to the jury so that the court could have corrected 
counsel in the presence of the jury. The objection, not 
being timely, should not be considered. If it is to he 
considered there is no merit to the same because it is 
not in accordance to what appears in the record and not 
of a prejudicial nature. 
There were no erroneous instructions given to the 
jury, and any error in any instruction was waived by 
the appellant by virtue of admissions and by requesting 
similar instructions. 
The appellant states that the court's instruction No. 
11 was erroneous because it "failed to take into con-
sideration the right of the defendant to assume that 
all persons would lawfully use the highway and would 
exercise reasonable and ordinary care until put upon 
notice to the contrary." 
: The court's instructions, particularly Nos. 22 and 
23, overcame this ob.jection and quoting from the latter 
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instruction, the court instructed as follows: "You are 
further instructed that the defendant, in driving his 
automobile was not an insurer of the safety of Spero 
Saltas, or, in fact, of any person -J: ~·: * And was not 
hound to anticipate unexpected acts of others, but had 
a right to assume that all other persons using the high-
way and particularly driving automobiles would use 
reasonable and ordinary care and would not violate the 
law unless and until defendant became advised to the 
contrary 7' * * And had a right to assume that the said 
Gerald Franz would keep a proper look-out and exercise 
reasonable and ordinary care for his own safety and for 
the safety of Spero Saltas." (Tr. 311) 
Appellant further complains that Instruction No. 12 
(Tr. 303) is erroneous, in that the City Ordinance, Sec-
tion 1382, contained in said instruction, was declared 
to he void in the case of State v. Lingman (Utah), 91 
P. (2d) 45?', as being contrary to the Utah Statute. The 
appellant, however, has waived and is estopped from 
questioning the validity of said ordinance in this case. 
Plaintiff's cause of action was predicated, among other 
things, upon a violation of Section 1382 (B), of the Salt 
Lake City Ordinances, and plaintiff alleged in Paragraph 
5 of his complaint that said ordinance was, at the time 
of the accident. "in full force and effect." (Tr. 3, Ab. 6) 
Defendant in his answer admitted "that at the time and 
place described in said complaint there was in full 
force and effect certain ordinances of Salt Lake City 
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relating to traffic and travel upon the streets of Salt 
Lake City, including the ordinances limiting the speed 
of automobiles in the residential district in Salt Lake City 
to 25 miles per hour." (Tr. 15, Ah. 12). The cases are 
uniform in their holding that one who desires to rely 
upon the invalidity of an ordinance must plead such 
fact, and allege facts showing it to he invalid. 43 C. J., 
page 579. In the case of Roper v. Greenspon, et al, (Mo.) 
198 S. W. 1107, which was an action for damages for 
personal injuries, defendant, in his answer, alleged con-
tributory negligence upon the part of the plaintiff by 
violating a certain city ordinance regulating speed; 
plaintiff's reply denied that he violated the said 
city ordinance. During the trial, the lower court, upon 
objection by plaintiff. refused to admit into evidence 
the ordinance pleaded in defendant's answer upon the 
ground that the ordinance was in conflict with the state 
statute. In holding that the trial court erred in refusing 
to admit the city ordinance into evidence, the Supreme 
Court said: 
"It is true than an ordinance of a city which 
conflicts with a state statute is void, hut if a 
party is relying upon the fact, such invalidity 
should he pleaded, where it appears, as here, that 
the adverse party had pleaded and is relying 
upon such alleged invalid ordinance. The 
invalidity of a statute or ordinance should he 
raised at the first opportune moment, and in this 
case that opportune moment was the reply. But 
the reply in this case proceeds upon the theory 
that the ordinance was valid, and specifically 
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denies that plaintiff was driving 'at a speed great-
ily in excess of and in violation of an ordinance of 
the city of St. Louis, Mo. at said time in force and 
known as section 1551.' From this it appears that 
plaintiff not only did not plead the invalidity, 
but on the contrary in his reply avers that said 
ordinance was 'at said time in force.' This amounts 
to a waiver of the alleged invalidity of the ordin-
ance, and it comes too late, when it is urged for the 
first time, when the ordinance is offered into 
evidence. We take it that the invalidity of an 
ordinance, like the unconstitutionality of a law, 
must be brought in at the first open door under 
the orderly procedure in the case. If the cause 
of action be founded upon a pleaded ordinance, 
the answer would be the first open door. If the 
defense in its answer relies upon a pleaded ordin· 
ance, then the reply would be the first open door. 
So that we conclude, as both opinions of the Court 
of Appeals conclude, that the invalidity of this 
ordinance is not in this case." 
In the case of Neary, et al, v. Northern Pacific 
Ry. Co., (Mont.) 110 P. 226, the plaintiff's complaint 
alleged that on the date of the accident there was "in 
force in the city of Billings" an ordinance regulating 
speed, which had been duly enacted; this allegation was 
not met by a general denial in defendant's answer. At 
the trial, the ordinance was offered in evidence over de-
fendant's objection upon the ground that the ordinance 
was unreasonable and void. Defendants assign such 
ruling as error. HELD-Ordinance properly admitted. 
"To us it seems clear that the denial in the 
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answer simply raises the question as to whether 
any such ordinance as that referred to in the 
complaint existed. The ordinance did in fact 
exist; it was offered into evidence. If for any rea-
son the defendant's desire to take the position that, 
on account of peculiar physical conditions, it 
ought not to be considered in force and effect in 
a particular portion of the city, they should have 
set forth the facts upon which their claim of an 
exception from the operation of the ordinance was 
based." 
See, also, American Fork City v. Charlier, 43 Utah 231, 
134 P. 'l39, where, in a prosecution for violating a city 
ordinance, our Supreme Court held: 
"One charged with violating an ordinance of 
a city punishing the illegal sale of liquor, who 
desires to assail the power of the city to pass it, 
should do so in the local court or in the district 
court on appeal, and he cannot raise the ques-
tion for the first time in the Supreme Court on 
appeal, unless perhaps where it appears on the 
face of the ordinance that the city exceeded the 
power." 
The courts apply the same rule where the pleadings 
admit the validity of a contract and deny the appellant 
the right to assail its validity for the first time on appeal. 
See Stewart, Stewart-Morehead Co. v. Bibb Mfg. 
Co., (Ga.) 124 S. E. 64. 
In the main case, appellant not only admitted the 
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existence and validity of the ordinance in his plead-
ings, but stipulated during the trial that such was the 
fact. (Tr. 15?' and 158). If appellant desired to establish 
the invalidity of the ordinance he should have alleged 
such fact in his answer and objected to the same when 
offered into evidence. The validity of an ordinance or 
statute cannot be attacked on appeal for the first time. 
It must be brought to the attention of the trial court in 
the first instance. It does not lie in appellant's mouth to 
take exception to an instruction based upon such ordin-
ance and now claim that such instruction was erroneous. 
In addition, appellant is estopped from asserting the 
invalidity of said ordinance and from attacking Instruc-
tion No. 12 upon the doctrine of invited error. A party has 
no right to complain of error in an instruction given for the 
opposite party, when like error appears in an instruction 
given at, his own request. Appellant requested and the 
trial court submitted to the jury Instructions No. 16, 19, 
and 22 (Tr. 183, 184, 189, and 308) which instructed the 
jury, among other things, that if they found that Gerald 
Franz was negligent in driving at a speed in excess of 
25 miles per hou-r, or in violation of said ordinance, and 
such act of negligence was the sole proximate cause of 
the accident, then their verdict must be in favor of the 
defendant. In requesting such instruction, appellant ·car-
tainly did so in contemplation of the validity of said 
City Ordinance, Section 1382. One inviting error by ask-
ing an instruction erroneously declaring a rule of law, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3t 
cannot except to other instructions so declaring it. The 
cases are all to this effect. 
· In the case of American Railway Express Co. v. 
Lancaster, (Ky.) 251 S. W. 670, the court stated: 
"It is first insisted that the court erred in 
assuming in its instructions that the violation of 
the traffic ordinance of Cincinnati was negligence, 
without any proof that such was the law of Ohio. 
Though it may he true that the legal effect of 
the ordinanc~ as applied to the facts, was not 
properly pleaded, there was no objection to the 
pleading on that score, and it is apparent, from 
all that occurred on the trial, that both parties 
not only relied on the ordinance in question, hut 
assumed that a violation of its provisions would 
constitute negligence. Indeed, appellant offered 
the ordinance into evidence, and asked an instruc-
tion based upon its provisions. While· this instruc-
tion was not given, another instruction embodying 
the same provisions was given. Therefore, if it 
he conceded that the court erred in the respect 
complained of, it is clear that the appellant was 
responsible for the error, and is not now in a 
position to complain." 
See also: 
Ashby v. Va. Ry. & Power Co., 122 S. E. 104 
Christiansen v. Devine, 210 Ill. App. 253 
Duckwall v. Davis, (Ind.) 142 N. E. 113 
Thomas v. Frost, 83 Utah 207, 27 P. (2d) 459 
Pulos v. D. & R. G. R. Co., 37 Utah 238, 107 
P. 241 
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106 P. 512 
Hunter v. Wm. M. Roylance Co., 45 Utah 135, 
143 P. 140. 
We submit therefore, that by reason of the fore-
going, appellant cannot claim that Instruction No. 12 is 
erroneous. 
Complaint is made of the court's instruction No. 14 
to the effect that it is misleading, in that it failed to 
define what constituted a first entry into the intersec-
tion. The court's instructions from 20-A to 26 (Tr. 309-14) 
fully answers all the objections of the appellant as they 
clearly instruct on the duty of drivers when two vehicles 
are approaching the intersection at the same time; and 
these instructions when considered together, fully and 
correctly state the law concerning the right-of-way at 
intersections. These instructions obviate all objections 
made by the appellant to the court's instructions Nos. 
15 and 17. 
We understand that its a recognized rule that the 
court's instructions, although separately stated, are to be 
construed as a whole. This is a stock instruction of all 
courts and was given by the trial court in this case in its 
instruction No. 31 when it stated: "These instructions, 
though numbered separately, are to be considered by 
the jury and construed as one connected whole. Each 
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instruction should be read and understood with reference 
and as a part of the entire charge and not as though any 
one instruction were intended to present the whole law 
of the case upon any particular point." (Tr. 316) 
There was no error committed in refusing appellant's 
requested instructions. 
As to the contention that the court erroneously 
denied appellant's requested instructions, we see no par-
ticular instruction which was denied that would in any 
way prejudice the rights of the appellant. The court 
fully, and more than fairly, instructed the jury as to the 
theory of appellant's defense and the matters that ap-
pellant complains about in the denial of his requests were 
either covered by the instructions given by the court 
or were not proper under the evidence, and thereby 
denied. 
There were rw errors in rulings on the evidence. 
We cannot see any error committed by the court on 
rulings on the evidence claimed in appellant's assign-
ments of error 28 to 33; the rulings were proper under 
the issues in this case. We feel that an examination of 
the evidence appearing in the record in this case justifies 
our statement that there were no errors committed by 
the court in rulings on the evidence; and we feel that 
citations on the points raised by the appellant would 
he a useless encumbrance upon the time of this court. 
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CONCLUSION 
While the appellant has raised every possible sem-
blance of an error in his brief and has cited numerous 
authorities, such authorities have no application in this 
case, and therefore no particular analysis of them is 
necessary. We feel, however, that the cases cited in 
respondent's brief clearly uphold the position of the 
respondent that there was no error committed of such a 
prejudicial nature that would entitle appellant to a new 
trial. He is certainly not entitled to have the first ver-
dict reinstated because the court was justified in exer-
cising its discretion in granting a new trial, as was shown 
by the verdict of the jury in the second trial. There is 
nothing in the size of the verdict to indicate that the 
jury were influenced by any allusions by references to 
insurance. The plaintiff proved a plain case of gross neg-
ligence on the part of the appellant in driving his truck. 
Plaintiff suffered a great injury in the loss of his son, 
not only from a financial point of view, but from a 
standpoint in the loss of his son's society, comfort and 
companionship which no pecuniary benefits can re-
place. There is nothing more precious than life, and no 
court should interfere with a judgment which was fairly 
rendered unless the wrong-doer has been prejudiced in 
his rights. We submit that there is no error in the record 
~I 
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in this case and that the judgment of the trial court 
should he affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
H. G. METOS, 
SAMUEL BERNSTEIN, 
.Attorneys for Respondent 
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